Ohio has given American law some of its most important decisions. Cases that began with a Cleveland home search, a Youngstown steel mill, a Westerville school levy flyer and a Cincinnati death certificate reached the Supreme Court of the United States and changed the law for the entire country. Others, decided by the Supreme Court of Ohio, reshaped how Ohio funds its schools and protects private property.
Each case below includes the official citation, the vote, who wrote the opinion, what happened, the legal question, what the court decided and why, the dissent, what happened next, and why the case still matters to Ohioans today.
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Citation
- 272 U.S. 365
- Decided
- November 22, 1926
- Vote
- 6 to 3
- Majority opinion
- Justice George Sutherland
- Dissent
- Justices Willis Van Devanter, James McReynolds and Pierce Butler dissented without a written opinion.
Background
In 1922 the Village of Euclid, a fast growing suburb east of Cleveland, adopted one of the first comprehensive zoning ordinances in Ohio. The ordinance divided the village into districts that limited where houses, apartments, stores and factories could be built. Ambler Realty owned about 68 acres along Euclid Avenue that it expected to sell for industrial use, which would have been worth far more than residential lots. Ambler sued, arguing the ordinance took its property without due process. Federal Judge David Westenhaver in Cleveland agreed with Ambler and struck the ordinance down.
The legal question
Can a local government divide land into use districts and restrict what an owner may build, even when the restriction sharply reduces the value of the property?
The decision
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court and upheld the Euclid ordinance as a valid exercise of the police power. A zoning law is constitutional unless it is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable and has no substantial relation to public health, safety, morals or general welfare.
The court’s reasoning
The Court compared zoning to nuisance law: just as a pig belongs in the barnyard and not the parlor, communities may separate uses that do not belong together. The majority accepted the village’s reasons, including reducing traffic, fire risk, noise and congestion in residential neighborhoods, and said courts should defer to local lawmakers on these judgments. The case was argued twice before the Court reached its decision.
What happened next
Only two years later, in Nectow v. City of Cambridge (1928), the Court showed the limits of Euclid by striking down a zoning line as applied to one specific property. That pairing set the pattern still used today: zoning laws are presumed valid in general, but an owner may challenge how a rule is applied to a particular parcel.
Why it matters today
Separating land into single family, multifamily, commercial and industrial districts is known nationwide as Euclidean zoning, named after this Ohio village. Nearly every Ohio city and township zoning code, variance hearing and rezoning fight traces back to this case.
Back to the list of casesYoungstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Citation
- 343 U.S. 579
- Decided
- June 2, 1952
- Vote
- 6 to 3
- Majority opinion
- Justice Hugo Black, with separate concurring opinions by Justices Frankfurter, Douglas, Jackson, Burton and Clark
- Dissent
- Chief Justice Fred Vinson, joined by Justices Stanley Reed and Sherman Minton.
Background
In 1952, during the Korean War, the United Steelworkers and the nation’s steel companies reached an impasse over wages and a strike was set to begin. President Harry Truman believed a shutdown would cripple weapons production for troops overseas. On April 8, 1952 he issued Executive Order 10340 directing Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer to seize and operate the steel mills. Youngstown Sheet & Tube, one of the Mahoning Valley’s largest employers, and other steel companies sued to stop the seizure.
The legal question
Does the President have the power, without authorization from Congress, to seize and operate privately owned industry in order to avert a national emergency?
The decision
No. The seizure order was unconstitutional. The power to make laws belongs to Congress, and no statute or provision of the Constitution gave the President authority to take possession of the mills.
The court’s reasoning
Justice Black wrote that the President’s power must come from either an act of Congress or the Constitution itself, and neither applied. Congress had actually considered and rejected giving the President seizure power when it passed the Taft Hartley Act in 1947. Justice Robert Jackson’s concurrence became even more influential than the majority opinion. He described three categories of presidential power: strongest when the President acts with authorization from Congress, uncertain when Congress is silent, and weakest when the President acts against the expressed or implied will of Congress. The steel seizure fell in the weakest category.
The dissent
Chief Justice Vinson argued that the President has inherent authority to act in a genuine national emergency to protect the war effort, and that the seizure was a temporary measure to preserve the status quo until Congress could act.
What happened next
The mills were returned to their owners and the steelworkers struck for nearly two months before a settlement was reached. Justice Jackson’s framework has since been applied in Dames & Moore v. Regan (1981), Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006), Medellín v. Texas (2008) and Zivotofsky v. Kerry (2015).
Why it matters today
Any time a court reviews whether a President exceeded executive power, whether over emergencies, national security, tariffs or immigration, judges and lawyers start with the Youngstown framework. It is one of the most cited separation of powers decisions in American history, and it began with a Mahoning Valley steel company.
Back to the list of casesMapp v. Ohio
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Citation
- 367 U.S. 643
- Decided
- June 19, 1961
- Vote
- 6 to 3
- Majority opinion
- Justice Tom C. Clark
- Dissent
- Justice John Marshall Harlan II, joined by Justices Felix Frankfurter and Charles Whittaker.
Background
On May 23, 1957, Cleveland police officers went to the home of Dollree Mapp looking for a man wanted for questioning about a bombing and for illegal gambling materials. Mapp refused to let them in without a warrant. Hours later the officers forced their way inside and waved a piece of paper they claimed was a warrant. No valid warrant was ever produced in court. The officers searched the entire house and found materials Ohio law classified as obscene. Mapp was convicted of possessing them and sentenced to prison.
The legal question
May evidence obtained through a search that violates the Fourth Amendment be used to convict a defendant in a state criminal trial?
The decision
No. Evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible in state courts as well as federal courts. The Court overruled Wolf v. Colorado (1949), which had allowed states to use illegally seized evidence.
The court’s reasoning
The Court had required federal courts to exclude illegally obtained evidence since Weeks v. United States in 1914. Justice Clark reasoned that the right to privacy against unreasonable searches means little if police can ignore it and still use what they find. Letting state prosecutors use evidence that federal prosecutors could not also encouraged officials to work around the Constitution. The exclusionary rule, the Court said, is the only effective way to deter unlawful searches.
The dissent
Justice Harlan argued the Court should not have reached the search and seizure question at all, since the case had been briefed mainly as a First Amendment challenge to Ohio’s obscenity law, and that states should be free to choose their own remedies for police misconduct.
What happened next
Later decisions narrowed the rule, including the good faith exception in United States v. Leon (1984) and limits on exclusion in Hudson v. Michigan (2006) and Herring v. United States (2009). The core holding that states must exclude unconstitutionally seized evidence remains law.
Why it matters today
Every motion to suppress evidence in an Ohio courtroom, whether in an OVI stop, a drug case or a home search, rests on the foundation laid by Mapp. It is one of the most important criminal procedure decisions ever issued, and it began with a search in a Cleveland home.
Back to the list of casesSheppard v. Maxwell
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Citation
- 384 U.S. 333
- Decided
- June 6, 1966
- Vote
- 8 to 1
- Majority opinion
- Justice Tom C. Clark
- Dissent
- Justice Hugo Black dissented without a written opinion.
Background
On July 4, 1954, Marilyn Sheppard was beaten to death in her home in Bay Village, a Cleveland suburb on Lake Erie. Her husband, osteopathic physician Dr. Sam Sheppard, said he had struggled with an intruder. Cleveland newspapers ran front page editorials demanding his arrest, and the coroner held a televised inquest. At trial, reporters filled most of the small courtroom, were seated inside the bar next to counsel, and handled exhibits. Jurors were not sequestered and were exposed to constant coverage. Sheppard was convicted of second degree murder and spent nearly ten years in prison. E.L. Maxwell was the warden of the Ohio Penitentiary where he was held.
The legal question
Was Sheppard denied due process and a fair trial because the trial judge failed to protect him from massive, prejudicial publicity?
The decision
Yes. The Court ordered Sheppard released unless Ohio retried him within a reasonable time, because the trial judge failed to take steps to protect the jury and the proceedings from the carnival atmosphere created by the press.
The court’s reasoning
The Court made clear that trial judges have a duty to control their courtrooms and protect defendants from prejudice. The judge could have limited the number of reporters, kept them away from counsel tables, insulated witnesses, sequestered the jury, continued the trial or moved it to another county, and restrained lawyers, police and witnesses from releasing information to the press. Because none of these steps were taken, the verdict could not stand.
What happened next
Represented by a young F. Lee Bailey, Sheppard was retried in 1966 and acquitted. He died in 1970. Decades later his son pursued a civil wrongful imprisonment claim, which a Cuyahoga County jury rejected in 2000.
Why it matters today
Gag orders on trial participants, jury sequestration, careful jury questioning about media exposure, and changes of venue in high profile cases are all tools judges use because of Sheppard v. Maxwell. Its lessons matter even more today with social media and constant news coverage.
Back to the list of casesTerry v. Ohio
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Citation
- 392 U.S. 1
- Decided
- June 10, 1968
- Vote
- 8 to 1
- Majority opinion
- Chief Justice Earl Warren
- Dissent
- Justice William O. Douglas.
Background
On October 31, 1963, Cleveland Detective Martin McFadden, a veteran officer with nearly 40 years on the force, noticed two men, John Terry and Richard Chilton, taking turns walking past a downtown store window on Euclid Avenue and peering inside, roughly two dozen times in all. A third man, Carl Katz, briefly joined them. Suspecting they were planning a robbery, McFadden approached, identified himself and asked their names. When they mumbled a response, he spun Terry around and patted down the outside of his clothing, finding a revolver. He found a second gun on Chilton. Terry was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon.
The legal question
Does the Fourth Amendment allow police to stop and pat down a person for weapons without probable cause to arrest?
The decision
Yes. An officer may briefly detain a person when the officer has reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that criminal activity may be afoot. If the officer also reasonably believes the person is armed and dangerous, the officer may conduct a limited pat down of outer clothing for weapons.
The court’s reasoning
Chief Justice Warren acknowledged that a stop and frisk is a serious intrusion and is covered by the Fourth Amendment. But the Court balanced that intrusion against the government’s interest in preventing crime and protecting officers who face armed suspects. The frisk must be limited to what is necessary to find weapons; it is not a general search for evidence.
The dissent
Justice Douglas warned that allowing seizures on less than probable cause gave police more power than a judge has when issuing a warrant, and that such a major change should come only through a constitutional amendment.
What happened next
The Court later expanded and refined the rule in cases such as Adams v. Williams (1972), Minnesota v. Dickerson (1993), which allowed seizure of contraband identified by plain feel during a lawful frisk, Illinois v. Wardlow (2000), Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court (2004) and Arizona v. Johnson (2009).
Why it matters today
The Terry stop is the legal basis for most police street encounters and many traffic stop investigations in the country. Whether an officer had reasonable suspicion is one of the most frequently litigated questions in Ohio criminal courts.
Back to the list of casesBrandenburg v. Ohio
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Citation
- 395 U.S. 444
- Decided
- June 9, 1969
- Vote
- Unanimous (8 to 0), per curiam
- Majority opinion
- Per curiam opinion, with concurrences by Justices Hugo Black and William O. Douglas
- Dissent
- None.
Background
In 1964 Clarence Brandenburg, a Ku Klux Klan leader, invited a Cincinnati television reporter to film a Klan rally on a farm in Hamilton County. The footage showed hooded figures, a burning cross and speeches with racist statements and talk of possible revenge against the government. Brandenburg was convicted under Ohio’s 1919 Criminal Syndicalism Act, which made it a crime to advocate violence as a means of political reform. He was fined $1,000 and sentenced to one to ten years in prison.
The legal question
Can a state punish a person for advocating the use of force or violation of law in the abstract, without showing the speech was likely to cause immediate lawless action?
The decision
No. The Ohio statute was unconstitutional. Government may not forbid advocacy of force or lawbreaking unless the speech is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.
The court’s reasoning
The Court drew a sharp line between abstract teaching or advocacy of ideas, which is protected, and preparing a group for violent action, which is not. Ohio’s law punished mere advocacy and assembly, so it swept in protected speech. The decision expressly overruled Whitney v. California (1927), which had upheld a similar California law.
What happened next
The Court applied the imminence requirement in Hess v. Indiana (1973) and NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. (1982). Brandenburg remains the controlling test for incitement.
Why it matters today
Brandenburg protects speech across the political spectrum, including speech many find offensive or hateful, while still allowing prosecution of true incitement to imminent violence. Courts apply its test to protests, rallies and, increasingly, online posts. Ironically, a case brought by a Klan leader became one of the strongest protections for civil rights protesters and other dissenters.
Back to the list of casesMcIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Citation
- 514 U.S. 334
- Decided
- April 19, 1995
- Vote
- 7 to 2
- Majority opinion
- Justice John Paul Stevens
- Dissent
- Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist.
Background
On April 27, 1988, Margaret McIntyre stood outside a public meeting at Blendon Middle School in Westerville, a suburb of Columbus, handing out leaflets opposing a proposed school tax levy. Some of the leaflets were signed only as coming from concerned parents and taxpayers. A school official filed a complaint, and the Ohio Elections Commission fined her $100 for violating an Ohio law that required campaign literature to include the name and address of the person responsible. Mrs. McIntyre died while the case was on appeal, and her husband Joseph continued the case as executor of her estate.
The legal question
Does a state law banning the distribution of anonymous campaign literature violate the First Amendment?
The decision
Yes. Ohio’s ban on anonymous campaign literature was unconstitutional as applied to Mrs. McIntyre. The decision to remain anonymous is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.
The court’s reasoning
Justice Stevens pointed to the long American tradition of anonymous political writing, including the Federalist Papers published under a pen name. Because the law regulated core political speech, it had to survive exacting scrutiny. Ohio’s interests in preventing fraud and informing voters were already served by other laws and did not justify a blanket ban on unsigned leaflets.
The dissent
Justice Scalia argued that disclosure requirements have deep roots in American practice, that they protect the integrity of elections, and that the Court should defer to the widespread state laws requiring authorship information.
What happened next
The Court later upheld certain disclosure rules for regulated campaign spending in Citizens United v. FEC (2010) and Doe v. Reed (2010), so the boundaries of anonymous speech continue to be debated.
Why it matters today
McIntyre is regularly cited in cases about anonymous speech online, including efforts to unmask anonymous posters in defamation lawsuits. It began with a mother in Westerville handing out flyers about a school levy.
Back to the list of casesOhio v. Robinette
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Citation
- 519 U.S. 33
- Decided
- November 18, 1996
- Vote
- 8 to 1
- Majority opinion
- Chief Justice William Rehnquist
- Dissent
- Justice John Paul Stevens. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg concurred in the judgment.
Background
In 1992 a Montgomery County deputy stopped Robert Robinette for speeding on Interstate 70 near Dayton. After checking his license and giving him a verbal warning, the deputy asked whether he had any illegal contraband in the car and asked for permission to search. Robinette agreed. The deputy found a small amount of marijuana and a pill later identified as a controlled substance. The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled the evidence must be suppressed and adopted a bright line rule requiring officers to tell a lawfully stopped driver that the driver is free to go before asking for consent to search.
The legal question
Does the Fourth Amendment require police to tell a lawfully detained motorist that the motorist is free to go before a consent to search will be considered voluntary?
The decision
No. The Fourth Amendment does not require any particular warning. Whether consent was voluntary is decided by looking at the totality of the circumstances.
The court’s reasoning
Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that the Court has consistently rejected bright line rules in judging reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. Just as officers need not tell a suspect of the right to refuse consent under Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973), they need not tell a driver the stop is over.
The dissent
Justice Stevens argued that the deputy’s questioning after the purpose of the stop was complete amounted to an unlawful continued detention, so the search was tainted regardless of the warning question.
What happened next
On remand, the Supreme Court of Ohio again ruled in Robinette’s favor, finding under the totality of the circumstances that his consent was not voluntary. Later, in Rodriguez v. United States (2015), the U.S. Supreme Court held that police may not extend a completed traffic stop without reasonable suspicion.
Why it matters today
Consent searches remain one of the most common ways vehicles are searched in Ohio. Defense attorneys and prosecutors still litigate whether a driver’s consent was truly voluntary, and whether a stop was extended too long, using Robinette and Rodriguez.
Back to the list of casesDeRolph v. State of Ohio
- Court
- Supreme Court of Ohio
- Citation
- 78 Ohio St.3d 193
- Decided
- March 24, 1997
- Vote
- 4 to 3
- Majority opinion
- Justice Francis E. Sweeney
- Dissent
- Chief Justice Thomas Moyer and Justices Deborah Cook and Evelyn Lundberg Stratton.
Background
In 1991 a coalition of more than 500 Ohio school districts, led by the Coalition for Equity and Adequacy of School Funding, sued the State of Ohio in the Perry County Court of Common Pleas. The case was named for Nathan DeRolph, a student in the Northern Local School District. The plaintiffs showed that districts relied heavily on local property taxes, leaving poorer rural and urban districts with crumbling buildings, outdated textbooks and large class sizes, while wealthier districts thrived. The trial court ruled for the districts in 1994.
The legal question
Does Ohio’s system of funding public schools satisfy the Ohio Constitution’s requirement that the General Assembly provide a thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the state?
The decision
No. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the school funding system was unconstitutional and ordered the General Assembly to create an entirely new system.
The court’s reasoning
The majority found that the overreliance on local property taxes produced vast disparities and left many students in unsafe, inadequate facilities. A thorough and efficient system, the Court said, means every district must have enough funding to give students an adequate education, regardless of local wealth.
The dissent
The dissenting justices argued that school funding decisions belong to the legislature, not the courts, and that the Constitution did not require equal funding among districts.
What happened next
The Court revisited the case in DeRolph II (2000), DeRolph III (2001) and DeRolph IV (2002), repeatedly finding the system still unconstitutional. In 2003 the Court ended its jurisdiction over the case without a final remedy. Ohio lawmakers continued to debate funding reforms for years, including the Fair School Funding Plan adopted in 2021.
Why it matters today
DeRolph is one of the most significant education rights cases decided by any state supreme court. It shaped decades of debate over property taxes, school levies and state aid that still affects every Ohio school district and taxpayer.
Back to the list of casesZelman v. Simmons Harris
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Citation
- 536 U.S. 639
- Decided
- June 27, 2002
- Vote
- 5 to 4
- Majority opinion
- Chief Justice William Rehnquist
- Dissent
- Justices John Paul Stevens, David Souter and Stephen Breyer, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.
Background
In 1995 the Ohio General Assembly created the Pilot Project Scholarship Program after the Cleveland City School District was placed under state control. The program gave Cleveland families tuition aid, with priority for low income households, to attend participating private schools or public schools in neighboring districts. In the 1999 to 2000 school year, the vast majority of participating students attended religious schools. Doris Simmons Harris and other Ohio taxpayers sued Susan Tave Zelman, the state superintendent of public instruction, claiming the program violated the Establishment Clause.
The legal question
Does a government voucher program that allows parents to use public funds at religious schools violate the First Amendment’s ban on establishment of religion?
The decision
No. The program was constitutional because it was neutral toward religion and gave aid directly to parents, who then made a genuine and independent private choice about where to use it.
The court’s reasoning
Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that any money reaching religious schools did so only because of the choices of individual parents, not because the government directed it there. Parents had a range of options, including community schools, magnet schools and tutoring, so the program did not coerce families toward religious education.
The dissent
Justice Souter argued that the program in practice sent large amounts of public money to religious schools to pay for religious instruction, and that families had no real secular alternative for most available seats.
What happened next
Ohio later expanded school choice through the statewide EdChoice scholarship program. The U.S. Supreme Court built on Zelman in Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue (2020) and Carson v. Makin (2022).
Why it matters today
Zelman is the foundation of modern school choice law in Ohio and across the country, and it continues to shape debates over public funding for private and religious education.
Back to the list of casesCity of Norwood v. Horney
- Court
- Supreme Court of Ohio
- Citation
- 110 Ohio St.3d 353, 2006 Ohio 3799
- Decided
- July 26, 2006
- Vote
- Unanimous (7 to 0)
- Majority opinion
- Justice Maureen O’Connor
- Dissent
- None.
Background
Norwood, a city surrounded by Cincinnati, agreed to let a private developer build the Rookwood Exchange, a project of offices, shops and condominiums. The city declared a residential neighborhood a deteriorating area and moved to take the homes of owners who refused to sell, including Joseph Horney and Carl and Joy Gamble. The homes were not blighted; the main justification was that the new development would bring jobs and tax revenue. The homeowners challenged the takings.
The legal question
Does the Ohio Constitution allow a city to take private property by eminent domain solely because a new private development would produce greater economic benefits?
The decision
No. Economic or financial benefit alone is not a sufficient public use to justify taking private property under Article I, Section 19 of the Ohio Constitution.
The court’s reasoning
Justice O’Connor wrote that property rights are fundamental under the Ohio Constitution and that courts must review takings closely rather than simply deferring to the government. The Court also held that the term deteriorating area was void for vagueness as a standard for taking property, and struck down a statute that prevented courts from stopping a taking while an appeal was pending.
What happened next
Ohio’s decision came one year after the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Kelo v. City of New London (2005) that the federal Constitution allowed takings for economic development. Norwood showed that a state constitution can protect property owners more strongly than the federal Constitution. The General Assembly later revised Ohio’s eminent domain statutes.
Why it matters today
Norwood is a leading example nationwide of a state supreme court rejecting the Kelo approach. Ohio homeowners and businesses facing eminent domain still rely on it, and the Gambles were eventually able to return to their home.
Back to the list of casesObergefell v. Hodges
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Citation
- 576 U.S. 644
- Decided
- June 26, 2015
- Vote
- 5 to 4
- Majority opinion
- Justice Anthony Kennedy
- Dissent
- Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito each wrote dissents.
Background
Jim Obergefell and John Arthur had been together for more than 20 years in Cincinnati. When Arthur was diagnosed with ALS, they flew to Maryland, where they could legally marry, and wed on a medical plane on the airport tarmac in July 2013. Ohio would not recognize the marriage, which meant Obergefell could not be listed as the surviving spouse on Arthur’s death certificate. They sued, and Arthur died in October 2013. Richard Hodges, director of the Ohio Department of Health, was the named defendant. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which covers Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky and Tennessee, upheld those states’ marriage bans, creating a split with other federal appeals courts.
The legal question
Does the Fourteenth Amendment require states to license marriages between two people of the same sex and to recognize such marriages performed in other states?
The decision
Yes. The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee same sex couples the right to marry, and states must recognize those marriages lawfully performed in other states.
The court’s reasoning
Justice Kennedy described marriage as a fundamental right rooted in individual autonomy, the protection of families and children, and its role as a foundation of social order. Excluding same sex couples denied them the many benefits states tie to marriage and treated them unequally. The decision overruled Baker v. Nelson (1972).
The dissent
The dissenting justices argued that the Constitution does not address marriage, that the question should have been decided by voters and state legislatures through the democratic process, and raised concerns about religious liberty.
What happened next
The Supreme Court consolidated cases from all four Sixth Circuit states, but the case carries the name of the Ohio plaintiff. In 2022 Congress passed the Respect for Marriage Act, which requires federal and interstate recognition of valid marriages.
Why it matters today
Obergefell affects marriage licenses, divorce, child custody, adoption, inheritance, taxes and benefits for families across Ohio, and it is one of the most widely known Supreme Court decisions of the 21st century.
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